nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20201209-055707-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 201208s2020||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20201209-055707-0 doi eng 342 23 Łętowska, Ewa Author aut Disqualifying Instability On the Selective Application of Rule of Law Principles Łętowska, Ewa Verfassungsblog 2020-12-08 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The so-called conditionality mechanism (in other words: "money for the rule of law") provides that breaches of the principle of the rule of law that threaten the EU’s financial interests may lead to suspension of funding. Poland and Hungary oppose this conditionality as they – with good reason – fear that they might be affected by it. What is required not to be subject to this mechanism, however, is quite straightforward and can be reasonably expected by an EU Member State. funded by the government CC BY-SA 4.0 Budget conditionality Hungary Rule of Law Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/disqualifying-instability/ raw object