nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20200410-153004-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 200410s2020||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20200410-153004-0 doi eng 342 23 Tulich, Tamara Author aut Cooperative Federalism, Soft Governance and Hard Laws in Australia’s State of Emergency Tulich, Tamara Verfassungsblog 2020-04-10 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier To date, in Australia, there have been over 5,350 confirmed COVID-19 cases, 26 deaths and over 275,000 tests conducted. The majority of the confirmed cases were acquired overseas. Australia is a Federation with a national government and state and territory governments. This adds complexity to responding to a national crisis. So far, Australia’s response has been characterised by cooperative federalism, at least nominally, primarily through a newly formed National Cabinet. There has been a staged ratcheting up of border controls and executive powers to prevent and control the spread of COVID-19, and a ‘hibernation’ approach to the conduct of business and exercise of fundamental rights. In this post, we discuss the governance model through the National Cabinet, the hard law response at Federal and State and Territory level and the extensive economic interventions. funded by the government CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Australia Coronavirus COVID 19 emergency powers Rizzi, Marco Author aut McGaughey, Fiona Author aut Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/fighting-covid-19-legal-powers-and-risks-australia/ raw object