nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20200519-013420-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 200518s2020||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20200519-013420-0 doi eng 342 23 Eleftheriadis, Pavlos Author aut Germany’s Failing Court Eleftheriadis, Pavlos Verfassungsblog 2020-05-18 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The German Federal Constitutional Court’s PSPP judgment depends on three intricate principles that the Court says are implicit in the German constitution, to such an extent that they are ‘unamendable’ under the ‘eternity’ clause of Article 79. These principles, however, are unique to Germany and unfamiliar in other European jurisdictions. Thereby the German Court has taken a ultimately illegitimate turn towards a narrow and inward interpretation of its constitution, which inexplicably neglects its European dimension. Given the potential effects of Germany’s apparent defiance of EU law and in light of the current ongoing discussions about the desired increased burden-sharing among the winners and losers of the Eurozone, the internal constitutional argument in Germany is a matter of great significance for the future of the Eurozone. funded by the government CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 BVerfG ECB PSPP Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/germanys-failing-court/ raw object