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  <dc:identifier>http://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20190211-225821-0</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/introduction-constitutional-resilience-and-the-german-grundgesetz/</dc:identifier>
  <dc:title>Introduction: Constitutional Resilience and the German Grundgesetz</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Kovács, Kriszta</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kumm, Mattias</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Steinbeis, Maximilian</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Tóth, Gábor Attila</dc:creator>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:date>2018-12-06</dc:date>
  <dc:type>electronic resource</dc:type>
  <dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
  <dc:subject>ddc:342</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>Autocracy</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>Constitutionalism</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>democracy</dc:subject>
  <dc:publisher>Verfassungsblog</dc:publisher>
  <dc:relation>Verfassungsblog--2366-7044</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>CC BY-NC-ND 4.0</dc:rights>
  <dc:description>What lessons does the plight of the Polish and the Hungarian democracy hold for a seemingly stable constitutional state like Germany? How resilient would the German constitutional setup turn out to be in the case of an authoritarian majority taking and successfully holding on to power? What kind of legal or institutional changes may be helpful to make that event less likely and/or less hard to prevent? These were the questions we aimed to address in a debate jointly organized by Verfassungsblog and WZB Center for Global Constitutionalism, generously supported by Stiftung Mercator.</dc:description>
</dc>
