nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20201226-172622-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 201226s2020||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20201226-172622-0 doi eng 342 23 Closa Montero, Carlos Author aut Paradoxes and Dilemmas in Compliance and Enforcement Framing the EUCO compromise on Rule of Law Closa Montero, Carlos Verfassungsblog 2020-12-26 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Scholars have relentlessly argued for tougher EU action against illiberal governments whose actions erode constitutional checks and balances. The panoply of EU tools is large and it comprises mechanisms for compliance via dialogue and engagement, the several infringement procedures and other ECJ cases with RoL implications, and procedures seeking enforcement. Yet, EU action remains inefficient since, to date, none of these mechanisms, jointly or individually, have been able to extract substantial compliance but rather what Agnes Batory called “symbolic and creative compliance” designed to create the appearance of norm‐conform behavior without giving up their original objectives. This poor performance reveals a crucial paradox on rule of law compliance: the EU is a community of law that lacks the last enforcement mechanism; i.e coercion. funded by the government CC BY-SA 4.0 Authoritarian Equilibrium conditionality European Council Rule of Law Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/paradoxes-and-dilemmas-in-compliance-and-enforcement/ raw object