Framing the EUCO compromise on Rule of Law Closa Montero, Carlos Author aut Text xx# 2020 Verfassungsblog 2020-12-26 eng

electronic resource

remote

Computermedien

Online-Ressource

Scholars have relentlessly argued for tougher EU action against illiberal governments whose actions erode constitutional checks and balances. The panoply of EU tools is large and it comprises mechanisms for compliance via dialogue and engagement, the several infringement procedures and other ECJ cases with RoL implications, and procedures seeking enforcement. Yet, EU action remains inefficient since, to date, none of these mechanisms, jointly or individually, have been able to extract substantial compliance but rather what Agnes Batory called “symbolic and creative compliance” designed to create the appearance of norm‐conform behavior without giving up their original objectives. This poor performance reveals a crucial paradox on rule of law compliance: the EU is a community of law that lacks the last enforcement mechanism; i.e coercion. CC BY-SA 4.0 Closa Montero, Carlos funded by the government Authoritarian Equilibrium conditionality European Council Rule of Law 342 https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/paradoxes-and-dilemmas-in-compliance-and-enforcement/ 2366-7044 Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH 10.17176/20201226-172622-0 201226 10.17176/20201226-172622-0 Converted from MARCXML to MODS version 3.7 using MARC21slim2MODS3-7.xsl (Revision 1.140 20200717)