Personal instead of Institutional Power What is wrong with Putin’s Plan to Change the Russian Constitution Timofeev, Maxim Author aut Kryazhkova, Olga Author aut Text xx# 2020 Verfassungsblog 2020-01-20 eng
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 The gist of the constitutional reform suggestions in Russia is to cement the power of Vladimir Putin once he leaves the office, and to make this in a safe, controlled environment. The latter aim cannot be achieved within the boundaries established by the Constitution. Thus, the constitutional requirements are thrown into the litter bin of necessity. However, circumventing formal procedures still calls for a sort of justification. That is why the proposed plan relies on substitutes that would mask its deficiencies. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Timofeev, Maxim funded by the government constitutional amendment Constitutional Reform 342 https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/personal-instead-of-institutional-power/ Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH 10.17176/20200120-123544-0 200120 10.17176/20200120-123544-0 Converted from MARCXML to MODS version 3.7 using MARC21slim2MODS3-7.xsl (Revision 1.140 20200717)