nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20201103-115524-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 201103s2020||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20201103-115524-0 doi eng 342 23 O'Keefe, Cullen Author aut Stabilizing the US Judiciary by Threatening to Pack It O'Keefe, Cullen Verfassungsblog 2020-11-03 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Reforming the judicial appointment process in the US will take a constitutional amendment. Without it, reform attempts are likely to fail. For conservatives especially, altering the courts now, after securing a very conservative majority unprecedented in recent history, will seem unappealing. They may (perhaps correctly) conclude that, given their systematic advantages in the Senate and therefore electoral college, endless escalation is a game they may be able to win. This blog post proposes a simple mechanism that aims to force a stabilizing constitutional amendment forward while preserving the option to escalate if they cannot secure cooperation from the Republican party. funded by the government CC BY-SA 4.0 constitutional amendment Court Packing US Supreme Court Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/stabilizing-the-us-judiciary-by-threatening-to-pack-it/ raw object