nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20161214-095537 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 161214s2016||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20161214-095537 doi eng 342 23 van Rossem, Jan Willem Author aut The End of the Grand Coalition and the Significance of Stable Majorities in the European Parliament van Rossem, Jan Willem Verfassungsblog 2016-12-14 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier A few years ago, the German Constitutional Court had to rule on the significance of stable majorities in the European Parliament. Such majorities were not terribly significant, was the conclusion reached by the Court – at least not important enough to justify a three percent threshold for elections to the EP, laid down in German federal law. Under the constitutional conditions of the moment, the Court explained, the formation of a stable majority was not needed in the EU ‘for electing and continuously supporting a government capable of acting’. These past few weeks, a crisis has been unfolding in Brussels and Strasbourg that may turn out to be an interesting test case for the German Court’s analysis. funded by the government CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 European Parliament Jean Claude Juncker Political Commission Spitzenkandidaten Process Threshold Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/the-end-of-the-grand-coalition-and-the-significance-of-stable-majorities-in-the-european-parliament/ raw object