nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20180620-185858-0 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 180618s2018||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20180620-185858-0 doi eng 342 23 Fichera, Massimo Author aut The Italian President and the Security of the European Project Fichera, Massimo Verfassungsblog 2018-06-18 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In a previous post, I have argued that the recent decision of the Italian President Mattarella to refuse to appoint as Finance Minister Paolo Savona, was constitutional. Many have argued either in favour or against Mattarella’s decision, either from legal or political perspective, or both. My argument is as follows: (a) the decision to refuse Savona’s appointment is not only legal, but also legitimate, as confirmed by the legal-historical context, in which the Italian form of government has developed; (b) the reasons behind Mattarella’s decision are deeply linked with the “security of the European project”, a rationale which has been a constant feature of European integration. Yet conflicts and contradictions have been concealed for too long and should be addressed more directly. funded by the government CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/the-italian-president-and-the-security-of-the-european-project/ raw object