nam 22 uu 4500 10.17176/20160930-182753 DE-Verfassungsblog cr||||| 160930s2016||||xx#|||||o|||| ||| 0|eng|| 10.17176/20160930-182753 doi eng 342 23 Mac Amhlaigh, Cormac Author aut Triggering Art. 50 TEU: Interpreting the UK’s ‘own constitutional requirements’ Mac Amhlaigh, Cormac Verfassungsblog 2016-09-30 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Can the British government initiate the process of leaving the European Union without consulting Parliament? On September 28th the government released its legal position that the only constitutional way to give effect to the Brexit referendum result is through the exercise of the executive power. Some of the government's arguments appear to be on shaky grounds. The mere fact that the process has been caught up in legal wrangling before it has even begun shows that there is still a long, long road ahead before any sense of stability will return to British (constitutional) politics as well as the relationship between the UK and the EU in whatever form that may eventually take. funded by the government CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Art. 50 TEU brexit Parliamentary Sovereignty Max Steinbeis Verfassungsblog gGmbH Verfassungsblog 2366-7044 https://staging.verfassungsblog.de/triggering-art-50-teu-interpreting-the-uks-own-constitutional-requirements/ raw object