07 February 2022
9/11 on Turkish Shores
The 9/11 attacks exposed the precariousness of the public sphere, however, they did not result in a dramatic shift in the Turkish public sphere. Rather, the coup attempt of 2016 turned out to be Turkey’s “9/11 moment.” Continue reading >>
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11 January 2022
Restoration without the Constitution
After what is now almost a two-decade long rule by the governing party, there are strong indications that a strong reshuffling in Turkish politics is in the works. Support for President Erdogan and his party is declining. I argue, firstly, that it is a combination of factors that has led to this moment of changing fortunes in Turkish politics – a combination that sheds light on what tactics may successfully be employed by opposition forces who wish to put an end to autocracies. Secondly, I claim that constitutional restoration in Turkey does not require formal constitutional change. Continue reading >>
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07 April 2021
Turkey’s Constitution of 1921 and Turkey’s Culture Wars of 2021
2021 marks the centennial of Turkey’s so-called ‘Constitution of 1921’. Interestingly, both academics and politicians, who don’t often see eye to eye, describe the document in praiseworthy terms. An interesting picture has emerged as a consequence: Two diametrically opposed worldviews (largely secular constitutional law scholars on the one end and AKP officials and supporters on the other, to put it crudely) drawing inspiration from the same document but with different motivations and in order to reach different outcomes. Continue reading >>
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18 November 2020
“Is the Turkish Central Bank Independent?” as an Uninteresting Question
Yes, the Turkish Central Bank’s independence has been eroded in recent years. Yes, from 2016 until now, the Bank has had four different presidents (or governors, as they are called), which is unusual by all accounts. No, the Bank is therefore probably not independent — or as independent — as its Western counterparts. I do not find these somewhat trite but true statements about the Bank’s independence (or the lack thereof) terribly interesting. Not that they are unimportant, but because I think the erosion of the Bank’s independence is illustrative of deeper and far more curious attributes of competitive authoritarian regimes and how they sustain themselves (or fail at doing that). Continue reading >>
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19 October 2020
In (Partial) Praise and Defense of Justice Engin Yildirim
The Turkish Constitutional Court is yet again front and center in Turkish politics – and yet again because a first instance criminal court defied its ruling. What is new this time is that a justice of the Court, Engin Yildirim, chimed in, cleverly critiquing the defiant first instance criminal court – a move from an otherwise reticent institution that surprised lawyers, pundits, and politicians alike. Continue reading >>
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20 January 2020
Why the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Wikipedia Decision is No Reason to Celebrate
The Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) recently lifted the ban on Wikipedia and a surge of, in my view, unwarranted optimism has now sprung out of nowhere both among international and Turkish circles following the case closely. I fail to share this optimism. By all means, the lifting of the ban on Wikipedia is something to be happy about. But the timing and content of the TCC’s decision, when especially read through the political context in which it was handed down, do not give much reason to celebrate. Continue reading >>
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24 October 2019
Abusive Constitutional Lip Service
Amid Turkey’s heated agenda of constitutional politics during the past few years one issue seems to have received little to no attention: President Erdogan’s repeated call for reinstating the death penalty. Can Erdogan reinstate the death penalty? No, simply because he doesn’t have enough political support. But that isn’t the point. The point is how Erdogan uses the (unfulfillable) constitutional promise to reinstate the death penalty to consolidate his base. Continue reading >>
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11 September 2019
Recognizing Court-Packing
There is near scholarly consensus that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has successfully packed the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC). Court packing is commonly understood as expanding the membership of the court, appointing judges with long tenures that extend beyond a couple of election cycles, and who are ideologically committed to the executive’s constitutional vision. These elements, however, are still foreign to Turkey’s political elites. Continue reading >>28 March 2019
Is This President Erdogan’s Last Term in Office? A Note on Constitutional Interpretive Possibilities
Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected as president in 2014. In 2018, he was elected to the same position for a second term. The Turkish Constitution, aside from one exceptional case, is clear in its command that no-one may serve as president for more than two terms. Is this, then, President Erdogan’s last term in office? The short answer is maybe. Continue reading >>20 July 2018