16 February 2022
No More Excuses
Sitting as a full court, due to the exceptional importance of the case, the Court of Justice has dismissed the annulment actions brought by the Hungarian and Polish governments against the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. A non-exhaustive account of the main substantive issues addressed by the Court. Continue reading >>
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25 February 2021
The EU Parliament’s Abdication on the Rule of Law (Regulation)
To paraphrase a previous blog entry by Scheppele, Pech and Kelemen, if the The Decline and Fall of the European Union is ever written, historians will conclude that not only the EU’s two key intergovernmental institutions – the European Council and the Council – should bear the greatest responsibility for the EU’s demise, but also the EU Parliament. Indeed, by failing to challenge the legality of the EUCO’s December conclusions encroaching upon its own prerogatives, the EU Parliament might have just become an enabler of the ongoing erosion of the rule of law across the Union. Paradoxically, it did so after relying on incomplete and partial opinion of its own legal service advising the Parliament to trade the respect of the rule of law away for political convenience. Continue reading >>01 February 2021
In the EU, it’s the Rule of Law. In Poland, it’s Unconstitutional?
The Polish Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro, in his capacity as Prosecutor General, wants to apply to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal to have the EU regulation connecting the rule of law with the suspension of EU funds declared inconsistent with the Polish constitution. Why is the member of a government that has recently consented to adopting the regulation, now going to fight it? And are there any grounds for doing so? Continue reading >>
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30 December 2020
Conditionality Mechanism: What’s In It?
As from 1 January 2021 the Regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget will become applicable. A lot has been said about the outcome of the negotiation process of this new regulation for which all parties involved claimed victory, as it is usually the case once an agreement is reached. We would like to take this as an opportunity to evaluate the outcome from the personal perspective of two people engaged in the process of the negotiations at opposite sides – the European Parliament on the one side and the Council of the EU on the other side. Continue reading >>
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26 December 2020
Paradoxes and Dilemmas in Compliance and Enforcement
Scholars have relentlessly argued for tougher EU action against illiberal governments whose actions erode constitutional checks and balances. The panoply of EU tools is large and it comprises mechanisms for compliance via dialogue and engagement, the several infringement procedures and other ECJ cases with RoL implications, and procedures seeking enforcement. Yet, EU action remains inefficient since, to date, none of these mechanisms, jointly or individually, have been able to extract substantial compliance but rather what Agnes Batory called “symbolic and creative compliance” designed to create the appearance of norm‐conform behavior without giving up their original objectives. This poor performance reveals a crucial paradox on rule of law compliance: the EU is a community of law that lacks the last enforcement mechanism; i.e coercion. Continue reading >>
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22 December 2020
How to Quantify a Proportionate Financial Punishment in the New EU Rule of Law Mechanism?
The principle of a proportionate financial measure enshrined in the new EU rule of law mechanism should be informed by an improved EU Justice Scoreboard (EUJS) drawing on rule of law indices. Thereby, the sensitive matter of determining the amount could be supported also by quantitative data. This is important, because the Commission will face high political pressure when acting under the new rule of law mechanism. Continue reading >>
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22 December 2020
Ein Freund, ein guter Freund
Der Kompromiss mit den Regierungen Ungarns und Polens bezüglich des Rechtstaatsmechanismus hat eine Menge – berechtigter - Kritik erfahren. Das Appeasement von Regierungen, die gegen die Grundwerte der EU verstoßen, ist zwar in der Logik der Institutionen und des politischen Handelns in der EU tief verwurzelt. Aber die zahme deutsche Reaktion auf die Eskapaden der ungarischen Regierung hat durchaus strukturelle Gründe, die weit über die Logik der EU-Entscheidungsprozesse hinausgehen. Der perpetuierte Empörungsloop über das ungarische Regime in deutschen Feuilletons und Polit-Talkshows, an dem regelmäßig auch Regierungspolitiker teilnehmen, verbirgt die Realität: Nämlich, dass die deutsche Regierung, und vor allem die deutsche Wirtschaft, sich längst mit dem ungarischen Regime zum gegenseitigen Interesse und Nutzen arrangiert hat. Continue reading >>
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14 December 2020
Towards an EU Cast in the Hungarian and Polish Mould
It is a serious achievement on Hungary’s and Poland’s part to drive EU institutions so far into mocking the rule of law in the spirit of defending it. Then again, this is exactly what illiberal constitutional engineering is about: using familiar constitutional and legal techniques for ends that subvert constitutionalism and the rule of law. Continue reading >>
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13 December 2020
Compromising the Rule of Law while Compromising on the Rule of Law
Some EU leaders may assert that EU money will now be brought under the rule of law given that the Conditionality Regulation is now guaranteed to pass. But they are wrong. Continue reading >>08 December 2020
Disqualifying Instability
The so-called conditionality mechanism (in other words: "money for the rule of law") provides that breaches of the principle of the rule of law that threaten the EU’s financial interests may lead to suspension of funding. Poland and Hungary oppose this conditionality as they – with good reason – fear that they might be affected by it. What is required not to be subject to this mechanism, however, is quite straightforward and can be reasonably expected by an EU Member State. Continue reading >>
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