03 November 2020
Stabilizing the US Judiciary by Threatening to Pack It
Reforming the judicial appointment process in the US will take a constitutional amendment. Without it, reform attempts are likely to fail. For conservatives especially, altering the courts now, after securing a very conservative majority unprecedented in recent history, will seem unappealing. They may (perhaps correctly) conclude that, given their systematic advantages in the Senate and therefore electoral college, endless escalation is a game they may be able to win. This blog post proposes a simple mechanism that aims to force a stabilizing constitutional amendment forward while preserving the option to escalate if they cannot secure cooperation from the Republican party. Continue reading >>
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09 October 2020
Rule of Law as Ideology
On pride, humility and German-American constitutional friendship Continue reading >>
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02 July 2020
Farewell to the European Constitutional Tradition
On 1 July 2020, with Russia’s coronavirus cases passing 650,000 and following an elaborate spectacle of public affirmation, the Russian electorate eventually confirmed the constitutional amendments. First proposed by Russian president Vladimir Putin in January, the 2020 Russian Constitutional Amendments were initially planned to enter into force only three months later upon approval in an ‘all-Russian vote’ scheduled for 22 April 2020 but had to be postponed due to the spread of the coronavirus. Although many of these amendments have to be considered mainly symbolic, they constitute the most fundamental changes of Russia’s Constitution in its 26-year history. Continue reading >>
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20 January 2020
Personal instead of Institutional Power
The gist of the constitutional reform suggestions in Russia is to cement the power of Vladimir Putin once he leaves the office, and to make this in a safe, controlled environment. The latter aim cannot be achieved within the boundaries established by the Constitution. Thus, the constitutional requirements are thrown into the litter bin of necessity. However, circumventing formal procedures still calls for a sort of justification. That is why the proposed plan relies on substitutes that would mask its deficiencies. Continue reading >>
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07 January 2020
Once Again, a Laboratory for What Is to Come
The 1980 Constitution of Chile contained different “locks” that have entrenched some of the core social, political, legal and economic arrangements inherited from the dictatorship. While some parts of the original constitution (those most obviously connected to the authoritarian regime) have been changed in the years following its enactment, almost all the “locks” remain in place. The issue with the legitimacy of the Chilean constitution is twofold: its legitimacy is questionable both in terms of its pedigree and in terms of its capacity to keep open the space for political action. Continue reading >>28 March 2019
Is This President Erdogan’s Last Term in Office? A Note on Constitutional Interpretive Possibilities
Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected as president in 2014. In 2018, he was elected to the same position for a second term. The Turkish Constitution, aside from one exceptional case, is clear in its command that no-one may serve as president for more than two terms. Is this, then, President Erdogan’s last term in office? The short answer is maybe. Continue reading >>25 October 2018
On the Brink of Joining Poland and Hungary: The Night of Surprises in the Slovak Parliament
The relatively short political history of the Slovak parliament has already witnessed several dramatic sessions. The latest drama unfolded during the night of 23 October in a parliamentary session to discuss and vote on an amendment of the Constitution and a new Act on the Constitutional Court that could have put Slovakia on a direct path to follow Hungary and Poland. The night turned out to be full of surprises. Continue reading >>29 June 2018
Fidesz and Faith: Ethno-Nationalism in Hungary
“The protection of Hungary’s self-identity and its Christian culture is the duty of all state organizations” says one of the new provisions that were adopted on 20 June to change the country’s Fundamental Law of 2011. Besides its potential to limit fundamental rights, what are the possible consequences of this constitutional change, in legal, cultural and political terms? Continue reading >>27 September 2017
The Catalunya Conundrum, Part 2: A Full-Blown Constitutional Crisis for Spain
In Part 1, we have explained the rigidity of the constitutional doctrine of our Constitutional Court on the matter of regional independence movements. There are some evident conclusions that swiftly appear – most of all that the only legal way for a hypothetical majority of Catalan citizens to express their wish to secede or at least to consult with the population on the issue, would presuppose a constitutional reform. This is a tremendously complicated matter in itself, though. Continue reading >>14 September 2016
Fighting Judicial Corruption with Constitutional Measures: the Albanian Case
No state can thrive with corrupt political and legal elites. But if lawmakers and judges are corrupt themselves, fighting corruption with legal means is all but impossible. As a step towards membership in the European Union, Albania has embedded a comprehensive reform of its anti-corruption law directly into its constitution. Continue reading >>
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