In Defense of Its Identity

The introduction of rule of law budgetary conditionality, as approved by the Court, is a first step in the right direction. But the Union must go further. Taking a page from fundamental rights and anti-discrimination law, we suggest the systematic, deliberate, and transparent incorporation of rule of law considerations into all Union policies and practices at all stages, from planning and legislation to execution and enforcement, with the aim of actively promoting, realizing, and sustaining the rule of law throughout the Union.

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No More Excuses

Sitting as a full court, due to the exceptional importance of the case, the Court of Justice has dismissed the annulment actions brought by the Hungarian and Polish governments against the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. A non-exhaustive account of the main substantive issues addressed by the Court.

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Full Steam Back

On 10 December 2021, almost exactly five years after its infamous Identity Decision, the Hungarian Constitutional Court was expected by the Government to declare the ECJ Judgement C-808/08 to be contrary to Hungary’s constitutional identity. But as a big surprise for many, the Court dodged the conflict and avoided to offer arguments against the supremacy of EU law to the Hungarian Government. Unlike Poland, it has only just prevented a full-blown conflict with the EU.

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The Sanctity of Preliminary References

A national supreme court must not declare a request for a preliminary ruling by a lower court unlawful on the ground that the referred questions are irrelevant and unnecessary for the original case. This has been held by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in its important decision C-564/19 IS. In addition, the CJEU held that EU law also precludes disciplinary proceedings from being brought against national judges on the ground that they made a reference for a preliminary ruling. The case also raises important questions to what extent preliminary rulings can be effective against rule-of-law decline and make up for political EU institutions’ failure to use adequate EU tools of supervision and enforcement.

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(Il-)Legal Gymnastics by Poland and Hungary in EU Border Procedures

This week, Poland has made headlines yet again for dispatching 12,000 guards to the border between Poland and Belarus and the use of tear gas to prevent third country nationals (TCNs), including children, from crossing into Polish territory. It is acutely problematic that Poland has foregone any semblance of conformity with EU law at all in the adoption of its domestic legislation on border procedures.

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A Closing of Ranks

On 11 and 12 October the Court of Justice of the European Union sat in Full Court composition (a rarity) to hear Hungary’s and Poland’s challenge of the legality of the rule of law conditionality regulation. Its ruling will follow (hopefully shortly) the Advocate-General’s Opinion announced for 2 December 2021. It will most likely reconfirm that the Union legal order is based on clear and binding rule of law norms, and that these must, of legal necessity, apply across all EU policy fields, including the EU budget. It will be a judgment of great significance about the very nature and purpose of the EU.

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Human Rights As Hate Speech

On 15 June 2021, the Hungarian Parliament passed Act no. LXXIX of 2021 which pursued a homophobic and transphobic agenda, curtailing the rights of LGBTQI people. The law was received with unprecedentedly harsh criticism, to which the Hungarian government responded in a resolution, adopted on 6 July. In it, human rights arguments are dismissed as a form of Western indoctrination.

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Oblique Strategies

On June 25, 2021 Hungary’s two top judges – the president of the Constitutional Court, Tamás Sulyok and the chief justice of the Kúria, András Varga Zs. – warned attendants of a conference on the Fundamental Law of an impending constitutional coup. They were addressing the nation’s legal elite – including the speaker of the Parliament, the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor in Chief – on the premises of the Kúria. The guardians of the Fundamental Law activated the language of militant democracy ahead of the 2022 elections.

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Attack on the Rights of LGBTQIA+ People in Hungary: Not Just Words, but Deeds as Well?

On 15 June, the Hungarian parliament voted by an overwhelming majority to pass legislation that, in essence, and under the pretext of protecting minors, bans images or content that depicts or ‘promotes’ homosexuality or trans-identity from the public space. The new law adds to a long list of measures already adopted by Hungary over the past several years, that also have the objective of discriminating and stigmatising the LGBTQIA+ population. These measures moreover are part of a wider context of deliberate erosion of liberal democracy in Hungary. The European Union's toolbox reveals its limits here. Why, therefore, not turn to the Council of Europe, with its European Convention on Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights?

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Solving the Copenhagen Dilemma

By proclaiming an entirely new ‘non-regression’ principle in EU law based on the connection between Articles 49 TEU (EU Enlargement) and 2 TEU (EU values, referred to from Art. 49), the Court of Justice achieved huge progress in addressing a well-known lacuna undermining the EU legal order. The ‘non-regression’ principle is a new important direction in the notable fight for the EU rule of law started with the discovery of EU competence in, in particular, the area of judicial independence and the organization of the judiciaries in the EU Member States.

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Jeopardizing Judicial Dialogue is Contrary to EU Law

On 15 April 2021, AG Pikamäe delivered his opinion in the IS case, originating from a Hungarian criminal proceeding against a Swedish national. The national judge referred three questions for preliminary reference to the CJEU, one regarding the suspect’s right to translation and two regarding the general status of judicial independence in Hungary. As a reaction, the Hungarian Prosecutor General initiated a so-called “appeal in the interests of the law” and the Hungarian Supreme Court held the reference to be unlawful.

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A Nation (Un)Dignified

The recent jurisprudence of Hungarian apex courts based on changes inserted into the Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011, and the provisions of the 2013 Civil Code on “violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation” set a dangerous precedent that could be broadly applied against critics of the government, aka the EU’s first electoral autocracy. The present blog post critically analyses a judgment of the Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria) of March 2021, which is highly likely to produce a chilling effect.

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The EU Parliament’s Abdication on the Rule of Law (Regulation)

To paraphrase a previous blog entry by Scheppele, Pech and Kelemen, if the The Decline and Fall of the European Union is ever written, historians will conclude that not only the EU’s two key intergovernmental institutions – the European Council and the Council – should bear the greatest responsibility for the EU’s demise, but also the EU Parliament. Indeed, by failing to challenge the legality of the EUCO’s December conclusions encroaching upon its own prerogatives, the EU Parliament might have just become an enabler of the ongoing erosion of the rule of law across the Union. Paradoxically, it did so after relying on incomplete and partial opinion of its own legal service advising the Parliament to trade the respect of the rule of law away for political convenience.

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Between Rule of Law and Reputation

On 27 January, Frontex announced the unprecedented decision to suspend its activities in Hungary. The choice to withdraw the Agency from Hungary is not a clear, serious, and meditated move in the Commission’s action for the rule of law. Nor is it a sign of a coherent and firm intention to put an end to the Agency’s engagement in human rights violations at EU borders, since it keeps operating in other frontline Member States with equally problematic issues. It rather represents an attempt to remedy the already compromised reputation of Frontex.

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Loyalty, Opportunism and Fear

The pressure on universities and academic freedom in Hungary is increasing. With a reform program initiated in 2019, the government has started to restructure universities, from a state-funded to a privately-funded model. At the end of the current round of restructuring in 2021, there will be more private universities than public ones. While universities officially have to request their privatisation to start the process, it is clear that the aim of the reform is to forcefully reduce the independence of universities. In January, a number of universities were given an ultimatum until the end of the month to decide on their transformation.

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Ein Freund, ein guter Freund

Der Kompromiss mit den Regierungen Ungarns und Polens bezüglich des Rechtstaatsmechanismus hat eine Menge – berechtigter - Kritik erfahren. Das Appeasement von Regierungen, die gegen die Grundwerte der EU verstoßen, ist zwar in der Logik der Institutionen und des politischen Handelns in der EU tief verwurzelt. Aber die zahme deutsche Reaktion auf die Eskapaden der ungarischen Regierung hat durchaus strukturelle Gründe, die weit über die Logik der EU-Entscheidungsprozesse hinausgehen. Der perpetuierte Empörungsloop über das ungarische Regime in deutschen Feuilletons und Polit-Talkshows, an dem regelmäßig auch Regierungspolitiker teilnehmen, verbirgt die Realität: Nämlich, dass die deutsche Regierung, und vor allem die deutsche Wirtschaft, sich längst mit dem ungarischen Regime zum gegenseitigen Interesse und Nutzen arrangiert hat.

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Still Waters Run Deep

That lawsuits taken by a Hungarian human rights NGO can reach the CJEU swifter than those launched by the Commission is clear evidence that strategic litigation and determined advocacy can move mountains. At the same time, this is also a cause for great concern. It speaks volumes of the Commission’s reluctance to promptly and effectively go after a Member State that deliberately ignores and breaches EU law.

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Towards an EU Cast in the Hungarian and Polish Mould

It is a serious achievement on Hungary’s and Poland’s part to drive EU institutions so far into mocking the rule of law in the spirit of defending it. Then again, this is exactly what illiberal constitutional engineering is about: using familiar constitutional and legal techniques for ends that subvert constitutionalism and the rule of law.

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Compromising the Rule of Law while Compromising on the Rule of Law

Some EU leaders may assert that EU money will now be brought under the rule of law given that the Conditionality Regulation is now guaranteed to pass. But they are wrong.

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Die Rückkehr der Jedi-Ritter?

Könnte man die finanziellen Covid-Hilfsmaßnahmen außerhalb des rechtlich-institutionellen Rahmens der EU vereinbaren – ohne Polen und Ungarn? Die Geschichte der europäischen Integration ist immer wieder von intergouvernementaler Zusammenarbeit jenseits des bestehenden Primärrechts vorangetrieben worden. Für die vorliegende Problemlage erscheint eine intergouvernementale Lösung zwar rechtlich möglich, sie erweist sich indessen aus nicht-rechtlichen Gründen als unbefriedigend.

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The Commission’s Al Capone Tricks

In its judgement dealing with the Central European University, the CJEU had to employ a trick to address the rule of law issue at stake: It found that Hungary had violated the General Agreement on Trade in Services. The legal trick was succesful but in reality, the ruling came too late. The Central European University has moved to Vienna and will not return to Hungary.

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So It Goes – Part I

The Hungarian government is now so routinely using unconstitutional emergency powers to circumvent constitutional constraints that one must conclude that the government’s main aim is to govern outside the very constitution that it wrote for itself a mere decade ago. At this point, it seems irrelevant whether this limitless power is achieved with or without the declaration of a constitutionally authorized state of emergency. Government unconstrained by the constitution in Hungary has become the norm and not the exception.

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A New Chapter in the Hungarian Government’s Crusade Against LGBTQI People

On 10 November 2020 - the same day the Hungarian National Assembly authorized the Government to rule by decree for 90 days in the state of danger - the Minister of Justice submitted a whole package of legislative reforms. Among them, the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary. Two proposed amendments would directly detrimentally affect the rights of the LGBTQI community, which, we argue, would make it extremely difficult to deconstruct the institutionalized trans- and homophobia which the government has been further entrenching for years.

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Power Grab in Times of Emergency

In the late hours on 10 November, the National Assembly adopted an Enabling Act authorizing the Orbán cabinet to govern by decree for 90 days, even though the executive already had very broad legislative power due to the introduction of the medical state of emergency. The ink was barely dry on the approval of the delegation of extraordinary legislative power to the government, when the Minister of Justice introduced several bills on important legislative reforms, such as the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law and changes to the electoral system.

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A game hacked by the dealer

There are many ways a government can undermine judicial independence, even without explicit legislative action. One of the most effective ways is to makes sure that the ‘right judges’ will get the important cases. At the Hungarian Kúria, the case allocation system clearly violate international standards.

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Of Asymmetries, Aspirations and…Values, too

How are the transnational legal order (“TLO”) and transnational governance affected by the democratic backsliding, authoritarianism and populism? As painfully evidenced by the Polish and Hungarian cases, the system of governance and constitutional design of the European TLO have been in error of “normative asymmetry”: transnational authority to ensure that the states remain liberal democracies has not been effectively translated into the transnational law and remedies. In order to make the TLO more responsive to the democratic threats, however, it is crucial to take on the challenges that go beyond institutional and procedural tinkering.

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The Last Days of the Independent Supreme Court of Hungary?

Ordinary courts seem to have remained the last bulwark of individual freedom and the rule of law since the Fidesz government has successfully undermined other nominally democratic institutions, including the Constitutional Court. While the recently published EU Rule of law report discusses the problems of judicial independence in great detail, so far, ordinary courts have resisted political pressure relatively well, largely because of the ruling party’s failure to capture the professional leadership of the judiciary. Various legislative changes by the government in recent years coupled with the upcoming election of the Supreme Court’s new Chief Justice, however, could be fatal to the independence of Hungary’s entire justice system.

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Finally: The CJEU Defends Academic Freedom

The CJEU’s judgment against Hungary in the CEU case is the first major judicial pronouncement by a European court on the institutional dimension of academic freedom as a fundamental human right. Infringement action has become the surprise weapon in the Commission’s rule of law toolbox. The initial surprise is a thing of the past: over the years the Hungarian government has built some defenses of its own, using familiar components of the European constitutional architecture in service of illiberal democracy.

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No Doubt, Lots of Benefit

The Hungarian government demanded the dismissal of Commissioner Vera Jourová over a quip she made in an interview in the German press. The day before the Commission’s first annual report on the rule of law is scheduled to land, the EU finds itself steeped in a high level inter-institutional conflict — sown by a self-proclaimed illiberal democrat. This is what being stranded by one’s own self-deception looks like.

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Fear and (Self-)Censorship in Academia

Concerns with media freedom in Hungary go back years and they are also used as the case study for the Reverse Solange proposal presented on this blog. The most recent event is the takeover of the largest online news portal, Index, where the entire staff left as a response. A less documented arena is the academic setting we work in and which influences our work and everyday life. In both fields, takeover and blatant censorship is but the tip of the iceberg: the most visible part and indicative of a larger problem. In this post, I describe the problem through illustrative cases and discuss possible responses.

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Aux armes, comédiens!

Revolutionary spirit in Budapest: students of the University for Theater and Film Arts blockaded the main entrance of their institution. The reason for resistance was another attack on academic freedom by the Fidesz government. It decided to “privatize” the university and to delegate the rights of control to a foundation established by the state - yet another stage in the government's culture war.

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Blaming the People is not a Good Starting Point

A few days ago a very thought provoking article written by Prof. J. H. H. Weiler was published on ICONnect blog. I very much agree with the core of his argument that we need to pay more attention to the popular support enjoyed by the Orbán government and we cannot blame everything and anything on him alone. However, there are several points in his argumentation which I would like to address.

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Defending the Open Society against its Enemies

On 18 June 2020, in the case of Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations), the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held that Hungarian authorities “introduced discriminatory and unjustified restrictions on foreign donations to civil society organisations” when it adopted a new legislation on NGO in 2017. How will the Hungarian government react? Six potential scenarios can be outlined from not doing anything (scenario 1) – an unlikely option due to the threat of pecuniary sanctions – to full and good faith compliance with the judgment resulting in the total repeal of the Lex NGO (scenario 6) – equally unlikely. Between these two, four additional ones may be foreseen.

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From Emergency to Disaster

This week, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government put before the Hungarian Parliament two draft laws that, if passed, would end the state of emergency and create a new legal framework for handing the pandemic from here on out.  In doing so, the government was responding to those who criticized the unlimited power that the government had been given in the law creating a pandemic emergency, the Enabling Act of 30 March 2020.  That law allowed the government to override any law by decree, a power that was unlimited in both scope and time and that violated Fidesz’ own “illiberal” constitution the Fundamental Law.  

The new laws are no better, and may even be worse.   One of the draft laws is less than one page long accompanied by two pages of justification.   It purports to repeal the initial Enabling Act (about which, more below).    The other one is called the law on “transitional provisions” and at first it seems only to provide lots of technical answers to questions that arise about how to reset deadlines for various legal processes that were delayed when the economy stopped. The new laws are no better, and may even be worse.

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Showdown at the Last Chance Saloon

As a political slogan, and a guideline in times of crisis, ‘whatever it takes’ undoubtedly has enormous appeal, and may in certain circumstances justify novel and untried forms of action. However, in a polity governed by the rule of law, there are limits to this approach which, if not respected, may cause greater problems than those which provoked the action in the first place.

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The Last Chance Saloon

To all intents and purposes, Orbán and his government have ceased to be democratically accountable either to the Hungarian Parliament or to the citizens of Hungary. The words in that last sentence are chosen carefully and with meaning. This blogpost suggest that Article 10 TEU may provide a basis for the exclusion of Hungarian representatives from the European Council and the Council of the European Union.

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The Curious and Alarming Story of the City of Göd

Misusing its extraordinary law-making powers which were conferred to it by the controversial Enabling Act during the epidemic state of danger, the Hungarian government expropriated the city of Göd. Apparently the government did so in order to punish the opposition lead municipality - and it seems to prepare further expropriations.

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Warum Europa nicht auf Ministerin Varga hereinfallen sollte

„Die Welt” berichtete am 12. April von einem Gespräch mit der ungarischen Justizministerin dr. Judit Varga über die am 11. März in Kraft getretenen Notstands- und Ermächtigungsgesetze. Die Ministerin halte die Kritik daran (so auch hier) für „Falschnachrichten” und „Ausdruck einer liberalen Meinungsdiktatur in Europa”. Da es sich hier um ein Notstandsgesetz handelt, will ich vorsichtig vorgehen. Bei der Beurteilung des Gesetzes ist allein der Text die maßgebende Tatsache. Die Stellungnahme der Ministerin gleicht aber eher einer politischen Propaganda als einer sorgfältigen Analyse der Regelung.

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On Doctrinal Contortions and Legal Fetishes

There seems to be a belief – especially persistent among some EU legal scholars – that even the largest political problems can be solved through the law. It suggests that any balance of authority and legitimacy between the EU and the Member States is, in fact, a mere technicality of institutional configuration, and a mere doctrinal sleight of hand would suffice to tip the scale of authority one way or another. This belief also seems to be underlying a recent blogpost by Christophe Hillion.

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Don’t Be Fooled by Autocrats!

On 9 April, Vera Jourová, Vice President of the European Commission for values and transparency with lead responsibility for rule of law, gave an interview to Euronews on democracy in the pandemic. A journalist asked whether she believes that Hungary still qualifies as a democracy after the Enabling Act creating an indefinite state of emergency was enacted by the Hungarian Parliament on 30 March. Her answer was not reassuring.

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Infringement Procedures in the Time of COVID-19

In the last weeks, members of the European Parliament and observers in the legal and academic community have, explicitly or implicitly, criticised the European Commission and the Court of Justice for their handling of ongoing infringement procedures. Put simply, the two institutions have been criticised for moving the existing cases forward, despite the fact that certain countries (first Italy, then followed by almost all other Member States) are in lockdown and, consequently, their administrations are unable to effectively respond.

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Fighting Fake News or Fighting Inconvenient Truths?

Last week, the Hungarian Parliament amended the Criminal Code: it created the new crime of “obstructing epidemic prevention” and amended the already existing crime of scaremongering (rémhírterjesztés). The old version did have some shortcomings but the now adopted modification addresses none of the previously existing problems and makes the crime more susceptible to abuse by the authorities.

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Die Unstrittigkeit des Zwecks

Wenn die Bedrohung, wie im Fall des Virus, als natürliche Gegebenheit auftritt, kommen leicht auch die Maßnahmen, um ihn zu beseitigen, als natürliche, d.h. fraglos vorgegebene Maßnahmen in Betracht. Eine Gefahr liegt hier darin, von einer Natürlichkeit des Zwecks auf die Natürlichkeit der Mittel zu schließen. Dass die Maßnahmen aber nicht natürlich gegeben, sondern politisch entschieden sind, muss demgegenüber im Blick bleiben.

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Pandemic as Constitutional Moment

Viktor Orbán has finally created for himself a constitutional moment, one where he can use the tools of constitutional democracy to access unrestrained powers to save the nation. This move should be a major concern for friends of constitutional democracy around the globe: in the midst of a global pandemic and a looming global economic crisis, PM Orbán may well be on route to kick start a genuine constitutional pandemic.

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Fighting Prison Overcrowding with Penal Populism – First Victim: the Rule of Law

On March 7th, a new Hungarian law came into force, allegedly intended to stop the “abuse” of compensation claims due to inhuman conditions in prison (“abuse law”). Even if this turns out to be yet another populist gimmick, the new legislation has important ramifications for the rule of law in Hungary because it sends the message to the citizens and the courts that the finality of judgements and court rulings are relative.

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The EU, Segregation and Rule of Law Resilience in Hungary

The legal and political consequences of the Hungarian government’s campaign against an appeal judgment which ordered the payment of compensation for school segregation can reverberate across the EU, because of the ubiquitous nature of segregation. Should the Hungarian government prevail, the case may negatively impact the integration of minorities in other Member States as well, particularly if the European Commission fails to increase its efforts to enforce the Racial Equality Directive.

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The Ghost of an Authoritarian State Stands at the Door of Your Home

In the late hot summer of 2033, in the home of a retired judge, a copy of a letter dated 21 February 2020 was lying on a desk. It was a father’s letter to his lawyer son. Here are its contents...

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The Hungarian “Lex NGO” before the CJEU: Calling an Abuse of State Power by its Name

On 14 January 2020, Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his Opinion in Case C-78/18 on the restrictions incorporated into a 2017 Hungarian law on the financing of NGOs from abroad. He makes clear that Hungary’s “Lex NGO” not only restricts the free movement of capital but also violates several fundamental rights, and is therefore incompatible with EU law.

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EU Rule of Law Dialogues: Risks – in Context

On January 16, 2020 the European Parliament passed a resolution about the state of the Article 7(1) TEU hearings with Hungary and Poland, noting with concern that “the reports and statements by the Commission and international bodies, such as the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe, indicate that the situation in both Poland and Hungary has deteriorated since the triggering of Article 7(1) of the TEU”. The resolution is a plea for a structured and more meaningful process in which each EU institution would exercise its existing powers in a meaningful and cooperative manner. The resolution emphasizes that the Article 7(1) TEU preventive process is one of risk assessment and one that may have actual – including budgetary – consequences.

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Silencing the Opposition in Hungary

On 10 December, the Hungarian opposition MPs got a lovely present from the governing majority for Christmas wrapped in a big legislative package amending both the Act on Parliament and the Rules of Procedure. The amendments to the parliamentary regulation serve the purpose of silencing the opposition parties which have been constantly gaining strength in the last few months.

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One Step Back, Two Steps Forward

The Hungarian Government has officially abandoned its plans to reform the administrative court system. However, the plan to subdue the judiciary is pursued as relentlessly as ever: On 12 November 2019, the Hungarian Government introduced an omnibus legislation which would extend political influence over the judiciary and guarantee judicial decisions favorable to the Government in politically sensitive cases.

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Alles eine Frage der eigenen „Wahl“?

Am 21. November 2019 hat die Große Kammer des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte in Straßburg (EGMR) seine Entscheidung über die ungarischen Transitzonen gefällt. Die Entscheidung dürfte in Bezug auf Transitzonen an europäischen Landgrenzen einen Präzedenzfall geschaffen haben – wobei das Urteil sehr problematische Implikationen enthält.

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Local Elections in Hungary: the Results in Context

On October 13, 2019 local elections were held in Hungary. Even though the opposition parties had to fight an uphill battle, they achieved significant success not only in Budapest, but also in other big cities. The aim of this article is to put the results in context in order to give a more accurate picture of the current Hungarian situation.

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Luxemburg as the Last Resort

A criminal proceeding has been suspended by a Hungarian justice of the Pest Central District Court to ask the European Court of Justice preliminary questions, inter alia, about his own judicial independence. Now, Hungary’s Supreme Court has stepped in and ruled that the reference was illegal, essentially arguing that preliminary references are not the fora to discuss such claims. In fact, however, this preliminary reference reveals that all other means to effectively challenge the rule of law backsliding in Hungary have failed.

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The Age of Constitutional Barbarism

We need to rediscover the force of normative arguments in order to better understand the autocratic rivals to liberal democracy. Geburtstagskind Verfassungsblog provides a vibrant and openly accessible forum for discussions.

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Fighting Fire with Fire

At the first sight, the likely nomination of Věra Jourova as Commissioner for rule of law and dropping Frans Timmermans out of the portfolio appears to be a significant victory for the Visegrad Group. However, considering Jourova’s track record, her nomination might be a clever, but hazardous move by Ursula von der Leyen that may deepen the cleavage among the Visegrad countries, put an end to their coordinated acting in sovereignty related issues, and cause more headache in Budapest and Warsaw than expected.

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A Hungarian Judge Seeks Protection from the CJEU – Part II

In 2012, Hungary introduced a unique system of judicial administration that was criticized by domestic and international actors. This criticism has been validated by events since then which have shown that the National Judicial Council, the highest collective body of judges, is practically unable to counter-balance the broad powers of the President of the National Judicial Office (NJO). This has caused tensions between judges and the judicial administration, something that was predictable in 2012 when the system was introduced and has led to what can only be described as a ‘constitutional crisis’.

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A Hungarian Judge Seeks Protection from the CJEU – Part I

For the first time, a Hungarian judge stayed proceedings to ask the CJEU preliminary questions about the independence of Hungarian courts. The questions concern the appointment of court presidents and the low salary of judges. The response of Hungarian authorities was quick: Within a week, the Prosecutor General requested the Kúria (Hungary’s Supreme Court) to review the reference with the possible effect of deterring other judges from asking similar questions.

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„No one has the right to be homeless…”

The Hungarian Constitutional Court's decision on the homelessness ban is not only devastating in terms of outcome, but also in terms of quality of the Court’s reasoning. This poor quality does not stem from the justices’ intellectual inability to adequately address the issues involved in this case, but from unacceptable political considerations spread among the members of the Court.

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Human Dignity for Good Hungarians Only

On 4 June 2019 the packed Constitutional Court of Hungary issued an astonishingly inhuman decision: The criminalization and eventual imprisonment of homeless people, the Court declared, is in line with the 2011 Fundamental Law of Hungary. According to the majority, “ (…) nobody has the right to poverty and homelessness, this condition is not part of the right to human dignity.”

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Dritte im Bunde: Für mehr Transparenz in der Partei- und Wahlkampf­finanzierung

Heinz-Christian Strache hat sich und seine FPÖ um Kopf und Kragen geredet. In dem heimlich aufgenommen Video, das den ehemaligen Parteivorsitzenden und Vizekanzler von Österreich in einer Villa auf Ibiza zeigt, schwadroniert er u.a. über einen Verein, der der FPÖ nahestehe und an den mehrere Vermögende gespendet hätten, vorbei am Rechnungshof. Der Vorgang wirft ein Schlaglicht auf Defizite der Parteien- und Wahlkampffinanzierung, nicht nur in Österreich.

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Administrative Judicial Reform in Hungary: Who Gives a Fig about Parliamentary Process?

In the past few months, the Fidesz government has been working on the reform of the administrative judiciary at full speed. The Constitutional Court recently had the opportunity to slow down the process of undermining judicial independence by invalidating the reform legislative act on the basis of procedural irregularities. Even though the law had been adopted as a result of a chaotic parliamentary vote, the justices did not find a violation of the Fundamental Law. The outcome is not surprising, as the Court cannot be accused of exercising a particularly strong control over the parliamentary legislative process in general. What is puzzling, however, is the massive amount of hypocrisy manifested in the reasoning.

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What Does the Spring Bring for the Rule of Law in Europe?

The Hungarian minister of justice requested the opinion of the Venice Commission on two bills establishing a new administrative court system in November 2018. Yet, before the Venice Commission got to have its say, the twin laws were adopted in December 2018, with the new courts expected to commence their work in January 2020.

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How to Defend the Integrity of the EP Elections against Authoritarian Member States

The elections to the European Parliament will take place in a few weeks’ time. There is a clear danger that some of the new MEPs will gain their mandates in elections organised by Member States that are not up to democratic standards. The European Parliament should try to defend itself from being infiltrated by MEPs with questionable democratic mandates. It already possesses the competence which is necessary for it, in the form of mandate validation.

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It’s Not Just About CEU: Understanding the Systemic Limitation of Academic Freedom in Hungary

Recently, there have been great disputes about the state of academic freedom in Hungary. As the country moved from democracy to electoral autocracy, its government started to limit individual and institutional academic freedom at a systemic level. This blog entry wants to explain how systemic limitation of academic freedom works in the higher education of the country, and how the general attack against check and balances affect the academic system.

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Systemic Error – On Hungary’s Extension of European Voting Rights to Non-Resident Citizens

Last December, the Hungarian legislator adopted a rule that allows non-EU-resident Hungarian citizens to vote at the European Parliament elections. This rule is in line with a 2018 Council decision. Implementation done, EU conformity secured, nothing to see here. Or is there?

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Fight Fire with Fire – a Plea for EU Information Campaigns in Hungarian and Polish

In the current crisis of democracy in the EU, we should not put too much pressure on the judiciary to fix the rule of law and democracy. Neither should we put too much hope for positive developments on (European) party politics. Rather I suggest that the EU should start speaking directly to the electorate via EU information campaigns in Hungarian and Polish. The 2019 European Parliament elections might provide an adequate framework for such campaigns.

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Of Red Lines and Red Herring: The EPP’s Delusions about Restraining Orbán

This post will offer an overview of the main EPP’s ‘red lines’ since the EPP leadership first demanded from Prime Minister Orbán that he immediately comply with EU laws and EPP values nearly two years ago, in April 2017. We will show that, contrary to Weber’s claims about EPP values being non-negotiable, Orbán has repeatedly crossed the EPP’s supposed red-lines with impunity. And rather than being restrained by the EPP, Orbán has sought to transform it.

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Stop Soros Law Left on the Books – The Return of the “Red Tail”?

On 28 February, Hungary's Constitutional Court found the so-called Stop Soros legislative package constitutional. Shocking as it may seem at first glance, this case reminds us how difficult it is to evaluate the judgments of a constitutional court operating in an illiberal political regime.

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An Advanced Course in Court Packing: Hungary’s New Law on Administrative Courts

The design and establishment of the new Hungarian administrative judiciary provides insight into a new style of engineering illiberal constitutional democracy through dialogue with European constitutional actors. It is not simply the case that Hungary is undertaking judicial reform while the Article 7 TEU process is on its way. Rather, a new phase of judicial reform is passed under European supervision despite the clear threat it presents for the rule of law.

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The CEU Leaves – Hungarian Students are Left in the Lurch

For 27 years Central European University has operated in Hungary’s capital. That era has come to an end. The forced move of the CEU to Vienna signals to Hungarians and other citizens in illiberal democracies that vulnerability is their future. They are left to the wayside by the international community, abandoned by the European Union, and left questioning who will ever defend liberal-democratic values in practice.

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Europe’s Rule of Law Dialogues: Process With No End in Sight

The cause for concern is not that violators of the rule of law are strategic political actors or that they are disingenuous. Rather, the real problem is the unspoken premise on the basis of which defenders of the rule of law are more and more inclined to accept these developments as the very features of the EU’s rule of law safeguards. This acceptance is based on the flawed premise that so long as a procedure is in place one cannot really do more to defend the rule of law.

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Never Missing an Opportunity to Miss an Opportunity: The Council Legal Service Opinion on the Commission’s EU budget-related rule of law mechanism

Regrettably, we need to add the Council’s Legal Service to the list of key EU actors that seem intent on ignoring the existential threat to the Union posed by the spreading rule of law rot amongst EU member governments. In a (non-public) opinion on the proposed regulation of the Commission to create rule of law conditionality in the multi-annual financial framework adopted on 25 October 2018, the CLS indeed put forward multiple unpersuasive legal arguments to claim that the Commission’s proposal cannot be adopted. With this opinion, the CLS is advising the Council to actually prevent other institutions of the EU from doing their job to uphold and defend the set of common values on which the EU is based.

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What Being Left Behind by the Rule of Law Feels Like, Part II

By now it must be clear to all that the Hungarian and Polish governments do have a plan that is built on staying within the Union, and changing it from the inside, (ab)using its institutions, resources and weaknesses to their own benefit. Every round and every step where European institutions falter in preventing moves to this effect is an opportunity for the offending member states to pursue their strategies even further.

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What Being Left Behind by the Rule of Law Feels Like, Part I

On October 25, 2018 Central European University (CEU) made international news again. President and Rector Michael Ignatieff announced that CEU is moving to Vienna, unless the Hungarian government makes progress by December 1, 2018 on the international agreement it is meant to sign with the State of New York under Hungarian law. In the last few hours many readers of this blog, friends and colleagues, took to asking how I felt about this. Disappointed, frustrated – but most of all: betrayed.

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Expanding the Franchise – another Sleight of Hand by the Hungarian Government?

The Hungarian government plans to expand the right to vote in the upcoming European elections to Hungarians living outside the EU. Is the aim of this plan simply to comply with EU law? Or is this another part in the long history of Fidesz trying to manipulate the franchise in their favour?

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Constitutional Pluralism between Normative Theory and Empirical Fact

It has been recently floated in legal academia and the blogosphere that it is high time for constitutional pluralism to bow out of the European scene. The reason? It has been alleged to be (1) “fundamentally flawed and unsustainable” for allowing the application of EU law to be selective and unequal and (2) prone to abuse by autocrats, as demonstrated by the ongoing dismantling of democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland where national (“constitutional”) identity is invoked all too often to justify patently illiberal policies. Is constitutional pluralism really to blame? What is this beast anyway?

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Executive and Legislative Organs of Hungary Disobey Court Rulings

Freedom of information is a heavily used tool of journalists and NGOs in Hungary, and a right protected by the courts and the Constitutional Court – but in some cases, even in very high profile cases, the process stops there. The judgement is not enforced, and the right to know remains theoretical and illusory, rather than practical or effective. Enforcement is increasingly eroded, which demonstrates the weakness of the Hungarian rule of law state.

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The Four Elements of the Autocrats’ Playbook

There is truth in the old maxim proclaiming the imperative to try to get to know your enemies well. We outline four key techniques deployed by the autocratic regimes in Poland and Hungary in order to consolidate the constitutional capture and massive assault on European values and take a look at some of the elements of each of the four.

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Beyond the Spectacle: The European Parliament’s Article 7 TEU Decision on Hungary

Emotions were high and voices loud while and after the European Parliament adopted its decision to trigger an art. 7 TEU procedure against Hungary this week. Once the dust settles, it might be helpful and disillusioning to look at the possible consequences, the collateral damages and the side-effects of the European Parliament's art. 7 TEU decision.

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How to Stop Funding Autocracy in the EU

The EU finds itself in the perverse situation of providing some of the largest transfers of funds precisely to those governments who most prominently thumb their nose at its democratic and rule-of-law norms. The legal debate about this misses the fact that the EU already has a sufficient legal basis to suspend the flow of funds to states in which rule-of-law norms are systematically violated. The real problem to date has not been the lack of adequate legal tools, but the lack of political will on the part of the European Commission to use the tools that already exist.

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Fidesz and Faith: Ethno-Nationalism in Hungary

“The protection of Hungary’s self-identity and its Christian culture is the duty of all state organizations” says one of the new provisions that were adopted on 20 June to change the country’s Fundamental Law of 2011. Besides its potential to limit fundamental rights, what are the possible consequences of this constitutional change, in legal, cultural and political terms?

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The Hungarian Constitutional Court betrays Academic Freedom and Freedom of Association

On 5 June the Hungarian Constitutional Court issued two injunction decisions, almost identical in their texts, which suspend the constitutional review procedures against two laws enacted in early April, 2017 by the Hungarian Parliament, outside the normal legislative process. The first, an amendment to the Act on National Higher Education known as „Lex CEU“ was challenged by a constitutional complaint, the second, the Act of the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Foreign Funds by 60 opposition MPs of the Hungarian Parliament with an abstract norm control notion. The handling of these two petitions by the Constitutional Court was odd in more than just one respect.

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“A Bad Workman always Blames his Tools”: an Interview with LAURENT PECH

Constitutional capture in Poland and Hungary and what to expect from the European Commission, the Council and the Court of Justice: an interview with Laurent Pech.

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There is No Such Thing As a Particular „Center and Eastern European Constitutionalism“

After a new landslide electoral victory by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a fresh perspective on constitutional developments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has started taking shape. It could be described as constitutional appeasement. The argument goes that given a widespread popular support for the constitutionally backsliding regimes in Hungary, Poland as well as elsewhere, we should start examining our own theoretical premises from which we have been observing and evaluating the developments in CEE. Perhaps, there is not everything wrong with CEE political and institutional developments?

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Judges under Attack in Hungary

Judges seem to irritate the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán who likes to talk officially about “the judicial state” and irresponsible judges. Despite many problems with judicial autonomy and practice, judicial independence itself has remained relatively intact from overt political influence so far. More precisely: the governing party and its friends could not completely rely on the courts to get favorable decisions. For example, governmental bodies have regularly lost cases initiated by civil legal organizations for the release of public information. That, however, might change after Orbán’s latest electoral victory.

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The Charming Smile of Viktor Orbán

The political campaign leading up to the recent Hungarian general elections was deeply flawed. One of the constitutionally suspicious steps of the party in power (Fidesz) was to blur the lines between the official communication of the Government (as a constitutional organ) and the campaign messages of Fidesz (as a candidate party). Unfortunately, none of the state institutions involved in the adjudication of the case could adequately address the constitutional issue.

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“Only Fidesz” – Minority Electoral Law in Hungary

Hungary is holding parliamentary elections on 8th April. While the systemic deficiencies of the Hungarian electoral system have received international attention, the present Hungarian regulation and the practice of minority and extraterritorial citizen voting also create several possibilities for abuse. Hidden behind the façade of multiparty elections, nation building and minority rights, the current system serves as an instrument to keep the government in power.

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The Emerging Trend of Parliamentary Performance: Freedom of Expression in the Hungarian National Assembly

Laurent Fabius, the former President of the French National Assembly, once called the parliament, rather poetically “a theatre of shadows”. It was a harsh criticism of the mostly formal and insignificant role of parliament in the legislative process under the excessive dominance of the Executive. A few years ago Hungarian opposition MPs decided to turn their own “theater” into something more meaningful, or at least more amusing. They have been using all kinds of creative techniques to express their opinion in the hemicycle. It seems, however, that the Speaker and the parliamentary majority do not really appreciate this new trend of performing arts for they constantly impose heavy penalties on the MPs. This practice is a reminder that the principle of parliamentary autonomy needs to be reconsidered in light of contemporary political realities.

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Academic Freedom in an Illiberal Democracy: From Rule of Law through Rule by Law to Rule by Men in Hungary

October 11, 2017, was supposed to be the day when the deadline for meeting the requirements of the notorious "Lex CEU" would expire. Two days afterwards, however, the Hungarian government announces to extend the deadline by a year – out of the blue. And that is not the only interesting thing that happened today.

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Mind the Gap! Schwierigkeiten der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in der EU

Seit Ende des Kalten Krieges haben sich sowohl internationale Organisationen als auch nationale Regierungen den Grundsätzen der Rechtsstaatlichkeit verschrieben - allerdings oft nur in Form von Lippenbekenntnissen. Welche Probleme resultieren aus diesem Vorgehen in der EU und vielleicht noch wichtiger: Was sollte dagegen unternommen werden?

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Hungarian Constitutional Identity and the ECJ Decision on Refugee Quota

The outcome of the lawsuit launched by the Hungarian Government against the EU Council’s decision on compulsory relocation of asylum seekers before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) took no-one by surprise, neither in Budapest nor elsewhere. Some may have hoped that the complaint would succeed legally, but nevertheless it has always been primarily a part of a well-devised political strategy based on the idea of national identity as a concept of constitutional and EU law.

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The EU as the Appropriate Locus of Power for Tackling Crises: Interpretation of Article 78(3) TFEU in the case Slovakia and Hungary v Council

The CJEU’s judgment in Slovakia and Hungary v Council of 6 September 2017 raises important instutional questions. As the Court implicitly recognises the EU as the appropriate forum for taking effective action to address the emergency situation created by a sudden inflow of third country nationals, it adopts its tendency towards purposive and effectiveness-oriented jurisprudence to asylum law.

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Art. 7 EUV im Quadrat? Zur Möglichkeit von Rechtsstaats-Verfahren gegen mehrere Mitgliedsstaaten

Ungarns Veto blockiert einen Beschluss nach Art. EUV, Polen das Stimmrecht im Rat zu entziehen, und umgekehrt. Lässt sich das Veto umgehen, indem ein Verfahren gegen beide Mitgliedsstaaten gleichzeitig eingeleitet wird?

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For Central Europe’s Illiberal Democracies, the Worst is yet to Come

Next week the Polish parliament will most likely pass a bill sponsored by the ruling Law and Justice party, introducing a total overhaul of the country’s judicial system. The tenures of all judges sitting on the Supreme Court, Poland’s highest judicial instance, will be immediately expired, while their successors will be installed by the justice minister. In other words, the members of the last judicial body standing in the way of Law and Justice eradicating tripartite division of powers and court independence will now be appointed by a politically tainted minister.

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Lex CEU: On the Commission’s Refusal to Disclose its Letter of Formal Notice in the Name of Mutual Trust

This post will offer a brief account of my unsuccessful attempts to gain access to the Commission’s letter of formal notice addressed to Hungary on 26 April 2017, that is, the letter adopted by the Commission in response to the adoption by the Hungarian authorities of what has become known as the Lex CEU. Before offering a critical assessment of the Commission’s reasoning, a brief account of the relevant context will be offered. This post will end with some general remarks on the EU’s repeated failed attempts to prevent illiberal not to say authoritarian regimes from consolidating within the EU.

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Much Ado About Nothing? Legal and Political Schooling for the Hungarian Government

After his infamous law against the Central European University, the EU Commission has announced a treaty infringement procedure against Hungary. That will probably be of limited help against the systemic threat to the rule of law in Viktor Orbán's state. Politically more effective might be the pressure exerted by the European People's Party.

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The Return of the Sovereign: A Look at the Rule of Law in Hungary – and in Europe

The Hungarian law makers have enacted a law that will make the operation of foreign-funded universities all but impossible, and aim to do the same to foreign-funded NGOs. These measures fail to meet even the most basic features of how legal rules are envisioned in a rule of law framework. The carefully crafted new Hungarian laws use the cloak of national security to stab the rule of law, as understood in Europe, in the heart.

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Legally sophisticated authoritarians: the Hungarian Lex CEU

Contemporary authoritarian leaders understand that in a globalized world the more brutal forms of intimidation are best replaced with more subtle forms of coercion. Therefore, they work in a more ambiguous spectrum that exists between democracy and authoritarianism, and from a distance, many of them look almost democratic. They take advantage of formalistic legal arguments against their enemies. Similarly, the new draft law of the Hungarian government also uses legal tricks to force the Central European University to cease operation in Budapest.

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The Hungarian Constitutional Court and Constitutional Identity

Ever since the 2010 parliamentary elections Hungary has set off on the journey to became an ‘illiberal’ member state of the EU, which does not comply with the shared values of rule of law and democracy, the ‘basic structure’ of Europe. The new government of Viktor Orbán from the very beginning has justified the non-compliance by referring to national sovereignty, and lately to the country’s constitutional identity guaranteed in Article 4 (2) TEU. This constitutional battle started with the invalid anti-migrant referendum, was followed by the failed constitutional amendment, and concluded in early December last year by a decision of the Constitutional Court, in which the packed body in a binding constitutional interpretation rubber-stamped the constitutional identity defense of the Orbán government.

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A Game of Values: Particular National Identities Awaken in Europe

The EU’s legitimacy is thin and this weakness is reflected in its impotence in the face of the drift towards authoritarianism in Central and Eastern Europe. It remains to be seen whether such an authoritarian turn as the Hungarian can happen in old democracies and if their institutions are strong enough to limit the effects of global processes which are shaping the national identities of societies and the impact of Member States on the shared EU framework.

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National Constitutional Identity in the European Constitutional Project: A Recipe for Exposing Cover Ups and Masquerades

On November 8, 2016 the Hungarian Parliament did not adopt the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law seeking to protect Hungarian constitutional identity in the face of European imposition. The Seventh Amendment was meant to cover up the minor scratch on the Government’s pride caused by lack of popular support for its relentless fight against the EU. Although the Amendment did not pass, supporters of European constitutional projects cannot afford to sit back and relax.

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Can Poland be Sanctioned by the EU? Not Unless Hungary is Sanctioned Too

Hungary has announced to block any Article 7 sanctions that the EU might propose against Poland. Why should Poland back down when nothing will come of standing up to the EU? Given Polish intransigence, the Commission may be tempted to stall for time or to retreat, which would be disastrous for the rule of law in the European Union. But the power to levy Article 7 sanctions can be restored. The Commission should do now what it should have done long ago. It should begin by triggering Article 7 (1) not only against Poland, but against Hungary as well.

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The Invalid Anti-Migrant Referendum in Hungary

After an unprecedented and partially illegal attempt to bring Hungarian voters in line against the EU refugee quota, the referendum launched by the government is invalid, as only around 40 percent turned out to vote. This was an own goal made by the Orbán government, which after overthrowing its predecessor as a result of a popular referendum made it more difficult to initiate a valid referendum.

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Hungary’s Struggle: In a Permanent State of Exception

The Hungarian government has called for a referendum on EU relocation quota plan and declared a “nationwide migrant crisis”. The justification given by the government for these measures was the “massive immigration” which “endangers the jobs of Hungarians and redraws Hungary’s cultural and religious identity”. The argument went that, due to a “migrant crisis” the Hungarian government needed a greater room for maneuvre, not limited by constitutional constraints, in order to manage the crisis. This argument presupposes that, as a result of the migrant crisis, Hungary has ended up in a state of exception, when constitutional guarantees have to be limited or suspended; essential powers have to be concentrated in the hands of the prime minister, until the crisis is overcome.

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Poland, Hungary and Europe: Pre-Article 7 Hopes and Concerns

The European Commission’s opening of a rule of law dialogue with Poland in the new pre-Article 7 format developed last year is an important test of European constitutionalism both on the EU and on the Member State level. The mechanism is meant to address systemic violations of the rule of law in several steps, in the format of a structured dialogue. The new procedure does not preclude or prevent the launching of an infringement procedure by the Commission. The probe into Poland’s measures against the Constitutional Tribunal and its new media regulation is expected to test the viability of an EU constitutional enforcement mechanism against a Member State.

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EU Law and Politics: the Rule of Law Framework

A voice from within Hungary's ruling party: György Schöpflin, Fidesz MEP and former politics professor from UCL, on the EU Commission's rule of law Framework, its activation against Poland and its use as a legal and a political tool.

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Hitting where it hurts the most: Hungary’s legal challenge against the EU’s refugee quota system

Following the drama and confusion on the South-Eastern borders of the EU in the hot summer of 2015, the EU and the Member States adopted a Council Decision which introduced a quota system for the distribution and settlement of asylum seekers and migrants. Its aim was to establish a regime for the fair sharing of burdens among the Member States. This quota system was opposed and subsequently challenged before the EU Court of Justice by Hungary, one of the worst affected EU Member States, by which it affirmed its position as a Member State which regards the Union primarily as an arena for vindicating its national interests, and which is not hesitant to prioritise its own interests, mainly in areas which fall within competences retained by the Member States, over those of other Member States and of the Union.

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“2004 EU Accession” as a Founding Moment? Of lost opportunities, alienating constitutionalism and vigilant courts

Much as the liberal elites in Poland are appalled by the ruthlessness of the attack on the Constitutional Court and the Polish rule of law, they are the ones to be blamed for the civic passivity that continues to define post-transition societies in general. The truly reformative potential of 1989, and then 2004, was lost when elites neglected the importance of connecting with the “real” people beyond the magic of the big-bang moments of 1989 and 2004. This "alienating constitutionalism" is one of the dark sides of 2004 Founding Moment, one that nobody really saw coming at the time of the EU Accession. Should the citizenry start embracing and defending the Court as "my own", the truly powerful legacy of the 2004 Founding Moment would be discovered.

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Judging Fears in Refugee Crisis

The current refugee crisis in the heart of Europe recalls the crucial contrast between rational worry and phobia. The historic decision of the US Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Schwimmer may help us understand the nature of fear in constitutional theory and practice.

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Viktor Orbán’s rampage to attract more far right voters

The latest dangerous ideas of PM Orbán and his government to reintroduce the death penalty in Hungary, to legitimate the disclosure of immigrants through the foreseeable result of a ‘national consultation’, and to legalize the segregation of Roma in public education further undermine the democratic values of Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union. This new wave of anti-rule-of-law populism is a direct consequence of the continuous decline of the governing party’s popularity.

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Does property protection entail a right to obtain social benefits under the ECHR?

It goes without saying that a supranational court’s engagement with national social policy is a sensitive endeavour. This is all the more so when the norms this court is protecting are of a ‘classic’, rather than of a socio-economic kind. In the recent case of Béláné Nagy v. Hungary the European Court of Human Rights seemingly recognises a right to obtain social security benefits under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, which contains the right to protection of property. The case was decided by a three to four vote and hence might be referred to the Grand Chamber. Yet it is especially the strong and diverging conclusions of the majority and the minority on a sensitive issue like the protection of social security qua property rights issue, that make this judgment worth elaborating upon.

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Hungarians outside Hungary – the twisted story of dual citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe

In 2010, Hungary amended its Citizenship Act to pave the way for a preferential naturalisation of Hungarians living abroad. This was met with great alarm among Hungary’s neighbours: As a consequence of the Trianon Peace Treaty in the aftermath of World War I, by which Hungary lost large swaths of its territory, a considerable part of the citizenship of Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine and other states nowadays consists of ethnic Hungarians. Four years after, tensions between Hungary and its neighbours with respect to dual citizenship are still palpable, since the number of new Hungarian citizens increases continually and already exceeds half million.

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Illiberal Democracy and Beyond in Hungary

Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán describes his country as "illiberal state", citing as role models authoritarian regimes like Putin’s Russia and dictatorial governments like China. As with citizens in any other nation-state, Hungarians certainly have the right to oppose the development of a liberal political system, if they are willing to accept certain consequences such as parting from the European Union and the wider community of liberal democracies. However, this conclusion must be reached through a democratic process, unlike the constitution making that took place in 2011, when Hungary’s leaders neglected to consult the people on their opinions about the very nature of the constitution.

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Legal but not Fair: Viktor Orbán’s New Supermajority

Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party coasted to a clear victory in last weekend’s Hungarian election, as expected. The governing party got 45% of the vote, but the new “rules of the game” turned this plurality vote into two thirds of the seats in the parliament. A continuing two-thirds parliamentary majority allows Orbán to govern without constraint because he can change the constitution at will. But this constitution-making majority hangs by a thread. Orbán’s mandate to govern is clear because his party got more votes than any other single political bloc. What is not legitimate, however, is his two-thirds supermajority. Orbán was certainly not supported by two-thirds of Hungarians – nowhere close. In fact, a majority gave their votes to other parties. Orbán’s two-thirds victory was achieved through legal smoke and mirrors. Legal. But smoke and mirrors. Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party coasted to a clear victory in last weekend’s Hungarian election, as expected. The governing party got 45% of the vote, but the new “rules of the game” turned this plurality vote into two thirds of the seats in the parliament. A continuing two-thirds parliamentary majority allows Orbán to govern without constraint because he can change the constitution at will. But this constitution-making majority hangs by a thread. Orbán’s mandate to govern is clear because his party got more votes than any other single political bloc. What is not legitimate, however, is his two-thirds supermajority. Orbán was certainly not supported by two-thirds of Hungarians – nowhere close. In fact, a majority gave their votes to other parties. Orbán’s two-thirds victory was achieved through legal smoke and mirrors. Legal. But smoke and mirrors.

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Collective Constitutional Learning in Europe: European Courts Talk to Hungary (Again)

Both the CJEU and the ECtHR have handed down decisions against Hungary, on the same day and only two days after the Hungarian national elections in which the party of PM Viktor Orbán, FIDESz, won an overwhelming majority. While the CJEU judgment on the data protection ombudsman is spectacularly technical, the ECtHR judgment on the 2011 church law is much more comprehensive. Both judgments bring sobering and timely reminders to a freshly reelected Hungarian government on the shortcomings of Hungary’s reinvented constitutional framework. At the same time, the two judgments can be read as a timely reality check on some key aspects of the Commission’s newly envisioned EU Framework for strengthening the Rule of Law. Both the CJEU and the ECtHR have handed down decisions against Hungary, on the same day and only two days after the Hungarian national elections in which the party of PM Viktor Orbán, FIDESz, won an overwhelming majority. While the CJEU judgment on the data protection ombudsman is spectacularly technical, the ECtHR judgment on the 2011 church law is much more comprehensive. Both judgments bring sobering and timely reminders to a freshly reelected Hungarian government on the shortcomings of Hungary’s reinvented constitutional framework. At the same time, the two judgments can be read as a timely reality check on some key aspects of the Commission’s newly envisioned EU Framework for strengthening the Rule of Law.

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Guys with Guns vs. Guys with Reports: Egyptian and Hungarian Comparisons

Sind Fidesz und die Muslimbrüderschaft vergleichbare Phänomene? Gábor Halmai über Parallelen und Unterschiede zwischen Ägypten und Ungarn.

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Constitutional Revenge

One year ago, Hungary’s slide from a multiparty democracy into […]

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Hungarian Ban Of Totalitarian Symbols: The Constitutional Court Speaks Up Again

Although the Hungarian government promised not to strike back after […]

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Ungarns Verfassungsgericht: Das Imperium schlägt zurück

Das ungarische Verfassungsgericht, so scheint es, ist trotz aller Versuche […]

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How to Evade the Constitution: The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s Decision on Judicial Retirement Age, Part II

Part Two: “The System Remains” (Continued from Part 1: The […]

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Romania In Hungary’s Footsteps: Different Victor, Same Strategy

By ANITTA M. HIPPER On January 1, 2012 with an […]

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“Is it a dictatorship and a police state yet?” Scheppele and Halmai on current Hungarian constitutional politics

Ever since the sweeping election victory of Victor Orbán’s FIDESZ […]

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